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Abstract
A lack of behavioural engagement in health promotion or disease prevention is a problem across many health domains. In
these cases where people face a genuine danger, a reduced focus on threat and low levels of anxiety or worry are
maladaptive in terms of promoting protection or prevention behaviour. Therefore, it is possible that increasing the
processing of threat will increase worry and thereby enhance engagement in adaptive behaviour. Laboratory studies have
shown that cognitive bias modification (CBM) can increase or decrease anxiety and worry when increased versus decreased
processing of threat is encouraged. In the current study, CBM for interpretation (CBM-I) is used to target engagement in sun
protection behaviour. The goal was to investigate whether inducing a negative rather than a positive interpretation bias for
physical threat information can enhance worry elicited when viewing a health campaign video (warning against melanoma
skin cancer), and consequently lead to more adaptive behaviour (sun protection). Participants were successfully trained to
either adopt a positive or negative interpretation bias using physical threat scenarios. However, contrary to expectations
results showed that participants in the positive training condition reported higher levels of worry elicited by the melanoma
video than participants in the negative training condition. Video elicited worry was, however, positively correlated with a
measure of engagement in sun protection behaviour, suggesting that higher levels of worry do promote adaptive
behaviour. These findings imply that more research is needed to determine under which conditions increased versus
decreased processing of threat can drive adaptive worry. Various potential explanations for the current findings and
suggestions for future research are discussed.
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Introduction
The lack of engagement in appropriate disease prevention or
health protection presents a real problem in many health domains.
For example, despite melanoma skin cancer posing a serious risk,
causing 48,000 deaths worldwide each year [1], many people still
do not engage in simple behavioural actions that can significantly
reduce the risks associated with sun exposure. Similarly, seatbelts
have irrefutably been proven to save lives, yet many people still do
not wear them [2]. Many health campaigns therefore endeavour
to persuade people to engage in adaptive prevention or protection
behaviour. Often this is done by attempting to instil a heightened
sense of fear or worry by increasing people’s awareness of their
susceptibility to the risk, or of the severity of the outcome.
Research has shown that such ‘fear appeals’ can be quite effective
in producing adaptive behaviour [3]. Indeed, the construct of
worry has been identified as a driver for adaptive health
behaviour. The majority of research supports a positive relation-
ship between worry and engagement in prevention/protection
behaviour, particularly in high risk populations [4].
In investigating cognitive processes underlying worry and
anxiety, experimental psychopathology research has shown that
these are associated with distinct processing biases [5]. Two of the
most thoroughly researched of these processing biases concern
attentional bias, defined as a pattern of selective attention
favouring the processing of threatening information; and inter-
pretation bias, defined as the tendency to interpret ambiguous
information in a negative way. Since then, cognitive bias
modification (CBM) has been established as a method for
changing these dysfunctional patterns of selective information
processing. CBM tasks aimed at reducing selective attention for
negative information (CBM-A) repeatedly expose participants to a
contingency that encourages participants to look away from
threatening information and instead attend to neutral or more
positive information [6]. CBM tasks targeting interpretation
(CBM-I) typically encourage participants to consistently resolve
emotionally ambiguous information in a more positive or benign
way [7]. Laboratory studies have shown that successfully
manipulating these biases to enhance processing of threat is
associated with an increase in anxiety vulnerability, whereas
modifying these biases to reduce processing of threat is associated
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with a decrease in anxiety vulnerability [6,7]. Naturally, all clinical
applications of CBM have implemented task variants designed to
reduce selective processing of threat to deliver emotional benefits
in clinical populations. A considerable body of literature has thus
highlighted that both CBM-A and CBM-I can be used to alleviate
symptoms of anxiety, depression, and excessive and pathological
worry [8]. Even though studies have shown that biases can also be
effectively altered to increase processing of threatening information,
the potential benefits of this approach in encouraging adaptive
behaviour have thus far not been exploited.
Cognitive models of emotion have indicated that the very same
information processing biases implicated in emotional disorders
can be adaptive when they target classes of information that signal
legitimate danger [9]. In these cases, the absence of processing
biases favouring threatening information is likely to decrease the
likelihood that an individual will accurately identify a genuine
threat, placing them at a greater risk of harm. As such, in these
situations a ‘‘positive’’ bias may be maladaptive. For example, the
tendency to consistently interpret instances of physical discomfort
as benign may lead an individual to experience comfortably low
levels of anxiety and worry, but will also prevent them from
seeking appropriate medical treatment. Similarly, interpreting the
change of your skin colour when out on the beach as a tan rather
than as sun damage might prevent you from using appropriate sun
protection. Therefore, when faced with a genuine threat, enhanced
processing of threatening information is likely to be adaptive. The
question thus arises whether CBM paradigms can be used to
modify selective processing biases to target greater processing of
information that poses a genuine threat to ultimately produce
more adaptive behaviour when facing a real threat.
Given that research supports a positive relationship between
worry and future prevention/protection behaviour, it is likely that
the success of health campaigns will depend on the degree to
which they can increase worry. Since it has been shown that a
negative interpretation bias causally contributes to worry symp-
toms [10,11], the aim of the current study was to investigate
whether adopting a negative interpretation bias, as compared to a
positive interpretation bias, can increase worry elicited by a health
campaign video, and consequently increase its effectiveness in
motivating adaptive behavioural patterns. To our knowledge, this
is the first study to investigate the potential applied benefits of
encouraging enhanced processing of threatening information via
CBM.
In the current study, participants were trained to adopt either a
positive or negative interpretation bias using emotionally ambig-
uous physical threat scenarios that remained ambiguous until the
last word. An example of such a scenario reads: ‘‘You have had
several minor infections recently and make an appointment to see
your GP. He gives you a physical examination and makes a few
notes. At the end he tells you that your physical condition is
very...’’. Depending on the training condition, the ambiguity in
these scenarios was consistently resolved in either a benign way
(i.e. ‘‘your physical condition is very good’’) or threatening way (i.e.
‘‘your physical condition is very poor’’) [12]. In each scenario, a
few letters of the last word were omitted and participants were
required to complete the word fragment in a way that was
consistent with the content of the scenario. By completing 100 of
these scenarios, participants are encouraged to adopt a pattern of
interpretation that favours imposing either positive or negative
disambiguations on emotionally ambiguous material. After this
training procedure, all participants watched a melanoma cam-
paign video provided by the cancer institute of New South Wales
designed to increase perceptions of risk and severity through a
graphical depiction of melanoma cells developing and spreading
through the body. Worry and negative affect were assessed before
and after the presentation of the video. After viewing the video,
sun protection/melanoma prevention behaviour was assessed
using a behavioural intentions questionnaire and a new measure
of adaptive sun protection developed for the purpose of this study.
This measure was designed to assess people’s prospective
engagement in ‘‘sun-smart’’ behaviour. This second measure was
developed in light of the low predictive value of traditional
measures of behavioural intentions on actual behaviour [13]. In
addition, many studies investigating the relationship between
worry and behaviour have not explicitly differentiated the state
worry and trait worry, although trait worry measures do not
account for the majority of variance in state worry measures [14].
Therefore, questionnaire measures of everyday worry and trait
and state anxiety were included to investigate whether state worry
elicited by the video is the best predictor of behaviour, rather than
general worry or anxiety.
We hypothesized that participants encouraged to adopt a
negative interpretation bias regarding physical threat would
experience more worry when confronted with a health campaign
video than participants encouraged to adopt a positive interpre-
tation bias. The second hypothesis was that to the degree the
interpretive training and the video campaign are effective in
increasing worry, people’s engagement in sun protection behav-
iour should be enhanced.
Methods
Participants
Participants were 40 undergraduate students from the Univer-
sity of Western Australia, participating for course credit. Partic-
ipants were recruited from a pool of 831 potential candidates who
were screened on trait anxiety [15] and melanoma worry (5 point
scale assessing worry about melanoma skin cancer, ranging from
not at all to extremely). To reduce the likelihood that participants had
strong existing biases, invitations were extended to students with
mid-range anxiety levels (middle third of the sample) and low to
average melanoma worry (score of 1 to 3). Participants in this
study were the first 40 people to accept this invitation. The final
sample consisted of 9 men and 31 women, with a mean age of 18.4
(SD = 1.8). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the
University of Western Australia. In accordance with the ethics
requirements, written informed consent was obtained from all
participants prior to the start of the study.
Materials
Questionnaires. State and trait anxiety were measured using
the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory [15]. This ques-
tionnaire consists of two 20 item scales. The State scale assesses
situational anxiety (asking people to report on how they feel right
now) whereas the Trait scale assesses dispositional anxiety (asking
people to report on how they generally feel). Items are rated on a 4
point scale resulting in scores ranging from 20 to 80, with higher
scores indicating higher levels of anxiety. Both scales have good
internal consistency and the STAI-trait version has demonstrated
excellent test-retest reliability [16].
Worry was assessed using the Worry Domains Questionnaire
short form [17]. The WDQ-SF is a 10-item measure assessing
normal everyday worry including worries relating to relationships,
work, future, finances and confidence. Responses are made on a 5-
point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely), yielding a
score of 0 – 40. The questionnaire has good psychometric
properties [17], and in the current sample, Cronbach’s alpha
was.91.
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Mood was assessed with six items asking participants to indicate
to what extent they currently experienced a particular affect.
These were rated on a 9 point likert scale anchored from not at all
to extremely. Three items assessed positive affect (excited, happy,
enthusiastic), and three assessed negative affect (irritable, dis-
tressed, anxious). These items were delivered on four occasions
across the study. For the analyses, the three items measuring
positive affect were averaged to a Positive Affect (PA) score, and
the three items measuring negative affect were averaged to obtain
a negative Affect (NA) score. Reliability analyses showed a
Cronbach’s alpha for the PA scale ranging from.873 to.893 over
the 4 assessment points, while Cronbach’s alpha for the PA scale
ranged from.627 to.786.
Melanoma worry was assessed using a single item asking
participants to indicate how worried about melanoma skin cancer
they were at present. Responses were made on a 9 point likert
scale anchored from not at all to extremely.
Interpretation bias training. One hundred emotionally
ambiguous scenarios were used to induce a positive or negative
interpretation bias. The scenarios focused on physical threat and
have previously been shown to be successful in inducing a
differential interpretive bias [12]. Each scenario comprises three
sentences which remains emotionally ambiguous until a final word
that disambiguates the emotional meaning in either a threatening
or benign way. An example of a scenario with the disambiguating
final words in parentheses reads as follows:
‘‘You are getting ready to go out and look at yourself in the
mirror. You notice a brown mark on your face that you do not
remember seeing before. It is very small and you realize it may
actually be (attractive/malignant).’’
Participants read each scenario, one line at a time. The last
word in each scenario was presented as a fragment (e.g. ‘‘at-rac-
ive’’ or ‘‘m-l-gnant’’, depending on training condition) that
participants had to complete by entering the missing letters.
Participants were instructed to read the scenarios and fill in the
blanks in the last word. They were informed that there was only
one correct solution for each word, and that they were to use their
understanding of the scenario to guide their solution of the word
fragment. Following word fragment completion, a comprehension
question followed which was consistent with or an extension of the
disambiguated meaning. The correct answer to this question was
dependent of the training direction. For example, the compre-
hension question associated with the above scenario is ‘‘Do you
think the brown mark could be dangerous?’’ For participants
trained to adopt a negative interpretation bias, the correct answer
is ‘‘Yes’’; for participants trained to adopt a positive interpretation
bias, the correct answer is ‘‘No’’. In each training condition, half of
the comprehension questions required a yes response and half
required a no response.
Filler task. To attenuate any potential mood differences
elicited by the interpretation training, a filler task without
emotional content was presented post interpretation bias training.
Three digits were presented on screen and participants were
required to indicate, as quickly as possible, if the majority of the
digits were odd or even by pressing the left or right mouse button.
Regardless of speed of response, the filler task went for five minutes
and no error feedback was given.
Melanoma video. To assess the influence of interpretation
bias training on the processing of melanoma related information
designed to influence behaviour, a melanoma health campaign
video was shown. This was a 30 second advisory campaign video
about melanoma skin cancer, created by and provided to us by
the cancer institute of New South Wales. It was created as part of
the ‘‘Dark Side of Tanning’’ campaign released in Western
Australia in the summer of 2009/2010. The aims of the
campaign were to (1) Increase understanding of the severity of
melanoma as a health issue, (2) Reduce pro-tanning attitudes, (3)
Increase understanding of the health consequences of unsafe
exposure to the sun, and (4) Increase the number of people
frequently using sun protection, as well as the range of sun
protection measures used. The video zooms in on a person
tanning on the beach, graphically showing how cancerous cells
develop and then spread through the body. The video can be
viewed at the following link: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v = wJ9HkvFFgyo.
Behavioural assessment: Lost luggage game. Engage-
ment in sun protection behaviour was assessed by a game
measuring preferential selection of sun protective items. The
computerised task was developed for the current study. Partic-
ipants were presented with a brief background story in which they
were to imagine that they were going on a summer holiday in
Australia and they discover upon arrival the airline had lost their
luggage. As compensation the airline provided a voucher of
$200AUD that could be spent on typical beach products. The
items and their corresponding prices were graphically displayed
on the next screen, and participants were encouraged to select
items up to $200 for purchase (see Figure 1). The items included
10 sun protection measures such as sunscreen and hats; and 10
other items such as a beach ball and Frisbee. Participants were
informed that each item displayed was an example item, with
final colour and style to be individually determined. Each non-
sun item was matched in price to a sun item. The cost of all items
totalled $400 meaning that participants could only purchase a
subset of items. A running total of the current amount spent was
displayed, and items could be de-selected if necessary. The ratio
of money participants spent on sun protection items, relative to
non-sun items, served as a measure of engagement in protective
behaviour.
Behavioural intentions questionnaire. This questionnaire
consisted of five questions, gauging to what extent participants
intended to engage in 5 different sun protection behaviours when
exposed to harmful sunshine in the following summer. These
behaviours were based on the five targets of the Australian Cancer
Council, who want to encourage people to ‘slip, slop, slap, seek, slide’:
slip on sun-protective clothing, slop on sunscreen, slap on a hat,
seek shade, and slide on wrap-around sunglasses [18]. Responses
were to be made on a five point scale, ranging from Never to Always.
Cronbach’s alpha for these five items was.57. Item-total correla-
tions revealed the lowest correlation for the ‘‘slop’’ item (r = .09).
Without this item, Cronbach’s alpha increased to.64. For the
analyses, all five items were included.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a positive or negative
interpretation bias training group. Participants first completed the
Trait Anxiety, State Anxiety, and Worry Domains questionnaire.
This was followed by the first baseline mood and melanoma worry
assessment.
The interpretation bias training started with four practice
scenarios in which the emotional ambiguity was resolved
consistent with a participant’s training direction. The presentation
of each scenario occurred in three phases. First, the initial two
sentences were presented on screen for four seconds. Next, the
third sentence was added without the final word for three seconds.
Then, the final word fragment was added and remained on screen
until response. Participants were encouraged to enter the missing
letters as fast as possible and press enter. A blank screen was then
presented for 500ms after which the comprehension question was
CBM to Increase Worry and Adaptive Behaviour
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 January 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e85092
presented until response. The screen display indicated a yes
response required a left mouse button press, while a no response
required a right mouse button press. Feedback on the accuracy of
the response to the comprehension questions was presented for
1500ms. The inter trial interval was 1000ms.
The interpretation bias training consisted of two blocks with
a self-paced pause in between. In the first block, 50 scenarios
were presented in random order. In the second block, another
50 training scenarios were presented, randomly interspersed
with 16 ambiguous test items to test whether the modification
of interpretation bias was effective [7]. These test items were
identical in the positive and negative training group. Half of
the test items were resolved positively, and half were resolved
negatively. A successful induction of a negative interpretation
bias would lead to participants in the negative training group
to respond faster to the negatively resolved test items than to
the positively resolved test items, and vice versa for people in
the positive training group. An interpretation bias index can
be calculated by subtracting reaction times on positive test
items from reaction times on negative test items. A higher
score is thus indicative of a more positive interpretation bias.
The interpretation bias training lasted approximately 30
minutes.
To assess whether negative versus positive training had a
differential effect on mood and worry, a second mood and worry
assessment was delivered immediately post training. This was
followed by the 5 minute filler task and a third mood and worry
assessment. Next, participants watched the 30 second melanoma
advisory campaign video and completed the final mood and
worry assessment. Participants then completed the lost luggage
game and the behavioural intentions questionnaire. At the end of
the session, participants were provided with the website of the
cancer council of Western Australia, and the sun-smart




The data of one participant was removed because they failed to
enter any responses on the test items of the interpretation bias
training task. For the analysis on the interpretation bias test items,
extreme reaction time outliers were removed prior to analysis.
Extreme outliers are defined as greater than or equal to 3
interquartile ranges above the upper quartile [19]. In the current
sample, the upper quartile is 3,955, while the interquartile range is
2,027.5. The cut-off for extreme outliers was therefore
10,037.5ms. Application of this cut-off removes 27 observations.
After removal of these extreme outliers, the data were shown to be
not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk = .841, p,.001). There-
fore, analyses were performed on median reaction times as these
measures are more resistant to the skew of a distribution [20].
Baseline characteristics
Independent samples t-test showed that participants in the
positive and negative interpretation bias training groups did not
differ in terms of Trait Anxiety (t,1), State Anxiety (t,1), Worry
(WDQ-SF: t,1; or baseline mood (PA: t,1; NA: t,1; melanoma
worry: t(37) = 1.45, p..1), see Table 1. Further, groups did not
differ in age, t(37) = 1.16, p..2, or gender, Chi-square (1, N = 39)
= 0.09, p..7.
Interpretation bias training
To assess whether an interpretation bias for physical threat had
been successfully induced, a Univariate ANOVA was conducted
with the interpretation bias index as dependent variable and
Group (positive vs. negative training) as factor. As foreshadowed in
the Method section, a larger interpretation bias index reflects
faster reactions to positive than to negative test probes, and thus a
more positive interpretation bias. Results showed a significant
effect of Group, F(1,37) = 3.97, p = .05, gp
2 = .10, such that, as
expected, the group that was trained to adopt a positive
Figure 1. Lost luggage game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085092.g001
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interpretation bias showed a larger interpretation bias index
(M = 384, SD = 670) than the group that was trained to adopt a
negative interpretation bias (M = 2115, SD = 886).
A similar interpretation bias index was calculated for accuracy
rates (in % correct) for the answers to the comprehension questions
of the test items, by subtracting accuracy scores on negative test
probes from accuracy scores on positive test scores. A larger index
thus reflects more accurate responses to positive than to negative
test items. A Univariate ANOVA showed a main effect of Group,
F(1,37) = 5.36, p,.05, gp
2 = .13, indicating a larger index for the
group that was trained to adopt a positive interpretation bias
(M = 5.1, SD = 12.3) than for the group that was trained to adopt a
negative interpretation bias (M = 23.8, SD = 11.6). There was no
significant difference between groups in the accuracy of the
response to the comprehension questions of the training items
(t,1).
Effects of interpretation bias training on mood and worry
A one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed
on post-training melanoma worry scores, with training group
(positive training vs. negative training) as independent variable,
and pre-training melanoma worry scores entered as a covariate.
There was a significant effect of training on post-training
melanoma worry scores after controlling for pre-training melano-
ma worry scores, F(1, 36) = 6.16, p,.05, gp
2 = .15, indicating that
participants in the negative training group experienced higher
levels of melanoma worry after training (M = 2.8, SD = 1.6) than
participants in the positive training group, (M = 1.5, SD = 1.6).
An equivalent ANCOVA on post-training NA scores revealed a
significant effect of training group on NA scores after controlling
for the pre-training NA scores, F(1, 36) = 4.51, p,.05, gp
2 = .11,
indicating higher levels of NA in the negative training group
(M = 3.9, SD = 1.3) than in the positive training group, (M = 3.0,
SD = 1.3). An equivalent analysis on PA scores revealed no
significant effect of training group on post-training PA scores after
controlling for pre-training PA scores, F,1.
The filler task was effective in removing the mood effects elicited
by interpretation bias training, as after the filler task participants in
the two training groups did not differ in PA (t,1), NA (t,1), or
melanoma worry, t(37) = 1.99, p..05.
Effect of interpretation bias training on video experience
To assess the impact of the video on mood in the two
interpretation bias training groups, a one-way analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on post-video melanoma
worry scores, PA scores, and NA scores separately, with training
group (positive training vs. negative training) as independent
variable, and pre-video scores entered as the covariate.
There was a significant effect of training on post-video
melanoma worry scores after controlling for the pre-video
melanoma worry scores, F(1, 36) = 5.88, p,.05, gp
2 = .14.
Contrary to our expectations, the results showed higher levels of
melanoma worry in the positive training group (M = 4.7, SD = 1.8)
than in the negative training group, (M = 3.3, SD = 1.8). An
equivalent analysis on NA and PA scores revealed no significant
effects of training group on post-video scores after controlling for
pre-video scores, Fs,1.
Worry and sun protection behaviour
In the lost luggage game, the proportion of money spent on sun
protection items (relative to total amount spent) served as a
measure of engagement in sun protection behaviour. The average
proportion of money spent on sun protection items was.59
(SD = .15, range.33 to.85), corresponding to an average of
109AUD (SD = 33, range 42 to 174). The average compiled score
of reported intentions to engage in sun protection behaviour was
17.16 (SD = 3.05, range 10 to 25). The correlation between the two
behavioural measures was not statistically significant, r(31) = .34,
p = .06 (due to technical difficulties, data from seven participants
on the behavioural intentions measure were lost). For both
measures, there were no significant differences between training
groups, ts,1.
To assess which cognitive or emotional constructs might be
associated with adaptive sun protection, correlational analyses
were performed with the two sun protection measures: the
proportion of money spent on sun items in the lost luggage game
(calculated as money spent on sun items divided by the total
amount of money spent), and the total score of the five behavioural
intentions questions. The correlation between these sun protection
measures and anxiety measures, worry measures, worry and NA
elicited by the melanoma video (measured as pre video scores
subtracted from post video scores), and the reaction time index of
interpretation bias was investigated. For an overview of these
results, see Table 2. The strongest correlation was observed
between video-elicited melanoma worry and the proportion
money spent on sun protection in the lost luggage game, t(39)
= .42, p,.01, indicating that the more participants increased in
melanoma worry because of the video, the more they spent on sun
protection in the game afterwards.
Discussion
The relationship between interpretation bias and worry
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether training
people to adopt a negative as opposed to a positive interpretation
bias can increase the effectiveness of a health campaign video by
inducing more worry. We hypothesized that (1) participants
encouraged to adopt a negative interpretation bias would
experience more worry when confronted with a health campaign
video than participants encouraged to adopt a positive interpre-
tation bias and (2) that the more worry was elicited by the video,
the more participants would engage in adaptive behaviour. Results
showed that contrary to our first hypothesis, participants in the
positive training group reported higher levels of worry in response
to the melanoma video than participants in the negative training
group. Regarding the second prediction, a bigger increase in
worry was indeed associated with more engagement in sun
protection as measured by the lost luggage game.
Table 1. Comparisons of the two training conditions at
baseline on anxiety, worry and state affect.
Positive CBM-I training Negative CBM-I training
M SD M SD
STAI-State 36.9 8.5 36.2 10.7
STAI-Trait 44.2 6.3 43.8 7.8
WDQ-SF 27.0 7.8 26.4 9.1
PA 5.1 1.8 5.5 1.5
NA 3.5 2.2 3.1 0.9
Melanoma worry 2.2 1.7 3.1 2.2
Note: STAI-State = Spielberger Anxiety Inventory – State version, STAI-Trait =
Spielberger Anxiety Inventory – Trait version, WDQ-SF = Worry Domains
Questionnaire - Short Form, PA = Positive Affect, NA = Negative Affect,
Melanoma worry = baseline melanoma worry.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085092.t001
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Surprisingly, the pattern of findings with regards to the first
hypothesis was opposite our predictions. Previous research has
shown that encouraging people who suffer from pathological levels
of worry to adopt a positive interpretation bias leads to fewer
worry symptoms [10,11]. In contrast, the current study found that
the induction of a positive interpretation bias led to a bigger
increase in worry when watching a health campaign video than
adopting a negative interpretation bias. Several explanations for
this effect can be considered. First, previous studies that have
influenced worry through positive CBM-I training have focused on
reducing maladaptive, pathological worry in clinical or sub-clinical
samples [10,11]. In these studies, worry was operationalized as the
number of negative thought intrusions experienced during a
breathing focus task. This type of intrusive worry is considered
maladaptive as it is irrelevant to the present task and goals.
However, it is possible that the type of worry induced through
health campaigns is different from such maladaptive worry in that
it is solution-focused in relation to a specific and real threat. As
such it is possible that this type of adaptive worry might be
triggered by different mechanisms. This may have been the case in
the current study where the type of worry assessed was very
relevant given the context (the melanoma video). It has been
suggested that rumination, a term often used to define worry, can
be divided into three categories. Action rumination is focused on
correcting past mistakes and achieving current goals, state
rumination focuses on the implications of failure, and task-
irrelevant rumination can serve to distract from a failure
experience and is focused on events or people unrelated to the
failure experience [21]. Research has shown that action rumina-
tion can lead to performance improvement relative to the two
other types of rumination when participants are given the
opportunity to repeat a task after they have been given failure
feedback on the first task completion [22]. Hence, when faced with
a problem or threat, some types of worry might be adaptive
whereas others might be maladaptive. The type of worry assessed
in the Hirsch et al. [10] and Hayes et al. [11] studies might be
classified as task-irrelevant rumination, which is maladaptive.
Given that worry in the health domain is known to facilitate
adaptive behaviour, it is possible that this type of worry is more
similar to action rumination. Perhaps to increase this action
rumination in non-clinical samples, different mechanisms need to
be targeted as compared to when decreasing maladaptive task-
irrelevant rumination. This is yet to be investigated.
Another possible explanation for lower worry produced by
negative training compared to positive training, relates to the
relative effectiveness of fear campaigns. It is interesting to note that
fear appeals tend only to promote protective behaviour when
people believe that there are actions that can be undertaken to
mitigate the risk that is communicated, and when people believe
they care capable of performing those actions [3]. In the absence
of such belief in self-efficacy, strong fear appeals may promote
behavioural avoidance rather than engagement. For example, a
study examining responses to threatening health information
showed that smokers exposed to threatening smoking-related
pictures were better able to disengage their attention from these
stimuli than non-smokers, indicating facilitated avoidance of fear-
related stimuli in those for whom the threat is particularly relevant
[23]. Thus, one possible account of the current results is that
training through negative CBM-I increased the personal salience
of negative health outcomes. Hence, when a fear campaign was
presented, those exposed to the negative CBM-I (for whom the
threat may be most relevant) actually avoided the message of the
video as an emotion regulation strategy and were consequently less
worried by its content than the positive training group. While the
data cannot determine whether this interpretation is correct, it
presents an important consideration in the planning of future
studies. For example, a manipulation of self-efficacy might be
included before the health promotion message, by conveying that
adhering to the appropriate norms for sun protection is either very
difficult or very easy. If low self-efficacy indeed contributes to
avoidance of health threat information, the latter message may
lead to less avoidance and more worry as compared to the former
message (many thanks to the Reviewer Louise Sharpe for this
interesting suggestion).
A third issue which could potentially bear on the present pattern
of findings regarding CBM-I and worry, is the relative match
between the training context and the context of the emotional
experience. In a recent study, Mackintosh, Mathews, Eckstein, &
Hoppitt [23] (Experiment 3) demonstrated that CBM-I only
influenced emotional vulnerability to a failure experience when the
content of the training and the content of the emotional
experience were matched. Specifically, only when the training
scenarios involved interpreting coping with failure in a benign
versus negative way, was a training-congruent difference in
emotional responding to the failure experience observed. Without
such specific matching of the content of the interpretations
targeted in the training scenarios and the stressor experience, there
was no influence of training on emotional vulnerability (Experi-
ment 1), or –similar to the current study- a reverse effect was
obtained such that participants in the positive training group
showed a larger increase in negative affect than participants in the
negative training group (Experiment 2). This reversed effect was
attributed to the contrast between the training scenarios which
involved imagining examination/test successes (positive training)
or failures (negative training) and the stressor task (a test failure
experience). After strengthening an optimistic bias during inter-
pretation bias training, participants in this positive training
condition may have experienced greater violation of such positive
expectancies by the unambiguously negative failure experience
that followed, whereas participants in the negative training
condition may have come to expect such aversive outcomes and
therefore experienced a lesser increase in negative affect as a result
of the failure experience [23]. Similarly in the current study, there
was a stark contrast between the content of the training in the
positive interpretation bias training condition (positive outcome to
potential physical threats) and the content of the video (unambig-
uously negative health threat). As with the findings of Mackintosh
Table 2. Correlation between the two measures of
engagement in sun protection with the anxiety, mood, worry








Interpretation bias index (RT) 2.03 2.23
Video elicited Melanoma worry .42** .23
Video elicited NA .26 2.17
**p,.01, +.05,p,.1.
^ The same pattern of results was observed when excluding the ‘‘Slop’’ item
from the behavioural intentions measure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0085092.t002
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et al. [23], it is possible that establishing a positive interpretation
bias via repeated exposure to positive/benign scenarios leads to
greater violation of positive expectancies in response to the
threatening melanoma video. This surprise effect may then
contribute to higher levels of worry elicited by the video.
The relationship between worry and behaviour
The second hypothesis relating to the relationship between
worry and adaptive behaviour was supported: there was a
moderate (.42) positive correlation between melanoma worry
elicited by the melanoma video and subsequent engagement in sun
protective behaviour as evidenced by the proportion of funds spent
on sun protection items in the lost luggage game. There was a non-
significant positive correlation between elicited melanoma worry
and behavioural intentions (.23). Sunsmart behaviour was not
associated with state or trait anxiety, and general worry was
negatively correlated with behavioural intentions. As such,
domain-specific state worry proved the best predictor of adaptive
behaviour.
The positive correlation between melanoma worry and
engagement in sun protective behaviour is consistent with other
findings that have shown that melanoma worry predicts greater
engagement in sun protection behaviour including the uptake of a
sunscreen coupon in sunbathers [24], and skin cancer screening
clinic attendance [25]. McCaul and Mullens [26] offer several
explanations for why worry might drive adaptive behaviour.
Firstly, the experience of worrying over something can be an extra
reason to take health protective action on top of already existing
reasons, and the more reasons there are to take action, the more
likely it is that action will be undertaken. Secondly, as worry
involves uncontrollable repetitive intrusive thoughts about the risk
or danger, worry may keep the issue salient and thus serve as an
active reminder that something needs to be done. This way, worry
might act as an ongoing cue to take action. Thirdly, worry might
produce mental simulations of the risk or danger, including
potential solutions to the problem [27]. This problem-solving
component might explain why worry, as opposed to anxiety, can
drive adaptive behaviour.
Strengths, limitations, and future research
The behavioural measure developed for the current study was
designed to provide an indication of future actual behaviour rather
than being limited to assessing past behaviour or behavioural
intentions [13]. Future research however could usefully investigate
the extent to which performance on this behavioural measure
corresponds to actual behaviour. A follow-up investigation of the
degree to which performance in the game versus self-reports of
behavioural intentions predicts actual behaviour would be a
valuable test of the ecological validity of these behavioural
measures. Preliminary results of a validation study do show a
significant correlation between the proportion of money spent on
sun protection in the game measured at the start of summer and
self-reported sun protection behaviour measured at the end of
summer, r(66) = .37, p = .002. Follow-up measures of melanoma
worry may also shed light on the potential long term impact of
differential interpretation bias training. Perhaps the temporal
proximity and the unambiguously negative nature of the video
caused this surprising pattern of results, whereas in the longer
term, a negative interpretation bias may still lead to greater worry
and subsequent enhanced engagement in sun protective behav-
iour.
The sample size in the current study was rather small, although
it was sufficient to detect a medium sized effect with a power level
of.80 [28]. A second potential limitation of the current study is that
only one measure of interpretation bias was included to assess the
effectiveness of the interpretation bias manipulation. Other
interpretation bias training studies have included other measures
that are less sensitive to response bias effects, such as a recognition
memory task. However previous research has shown that
modification of interpretation bias can be observed both in
responses to positive and negative probe sentences, and a
recognition memory task [7]. It is possible however, that the mere
exposure to positive and negative scenarios in the two training
groups could lead to the observed pattern of interpretive bias.
After all, perhaps simply repeatedly exposing participants to either
positive or negative scenarios would be sufficient to produce a
valence-congruent bias that would appear to be a differential
interpretation bias. However, recent research has shown that
repeated exposure to positive or negative scenarios alone is not
sufficient to alter perceptions of subsequent ambiguous informa-
tion and the presence of ambiguity in the training scenarios is
crucial to produce a differential training effect [29]. This provides
some reassurance that the pattern of induced interpretive bias
observed in the current study was indeed genuine.
To our knowledge, only two studies to date have investigated
the relationship between interpretation bias modification and
behaviour, and both were aimed at discouraging maladaptive
behavioural patterns associated with levels of worry and anxiety
that are too high (avoidance in people with phobias) [30,31] rather
than discouraging maladaptive behavioural patterns associated
with levels of worry and anxiety that are too low. Both studies
failed to find an effect of the modification of interpretation bias on
behaviour, but in one of these studies [31] it was argued that
changing automatic or reflexive behaviour through CBM-I might
not be effective because these behaviours could be independent of
the cognitive processing of threatening information. Briefly
enhancing or attenuating the processing of threatening informa-
tion through CBM might therefore have little to no effects on this
type of automatic behaviour and perhaps repeated training
sessions are needed to achieve such change. In contrast, modifying
patterns of cognition, by its very name, might be effective in
targeting behavioural change when the behaviour has a cognitive
basis. Indeed in the current study, the targeted behaviour is
dependent on intentional, conscious decisions to engage in health
protection. Similarly, mental imagery training has been shown to
influence behaviour with a cognitive basis [32]. People with
dysphoria who were trained to generate mental images in response
to positive image-word cues showed better performance (caught
more fish) in a subsequent fishing game than people in the negative
training or control conditions. Performance in this fishing game
reflected persistence, and is hence also cognitively based. Thus,
separate to the issue of whether the stimulation of adaptive
behaviour is best encouraged by enhancing or attenuating
processing of threatening or positive information, such modifica-
tion of cognitive processes might be selectively efficacious in
changing behaviour that has a strategic, cognitive component,
rather than automatic behavioural patterns.
The above mentioned study also highlights that other CBM
paradigms might also be effective in targeting behavioural change
in the context of health psychology. For example, attentional bias
modification has been shown to increase job performance in a
highly stressful workplace [33] (study 3b). If CBM-A can indeed
affect self-esteem, decrease stress and thereby increase optimal
performance, the question remains whether it can also affect
emotional and cognitive responding in a way that would optimise
patterns of behaviour in the context of health promotion or disease
prevention. Future studies could thus investigate the effectiveness
of other CBM paradigms to target health behaviour. Independent
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of the paradigm used, future studies should consider devising
material that matches closely in content to the type of behaviour
that is targeted as research has shown that matching the content of
training to the intended target for change is more likely to be
effective [23]. For example, when targeting sun protection
behaviour, a content-matched training scenario could read as
follows: ‘‘You feel the heat of the sun on your skin when you are at
the beach in the middle of a summer day. Considering the time
since you last put on sunscreen, your chances of getting burnt are
high/low’’.
The current study presents a first investigation into increasing
worry through cognitive bias modification for interpretation to
effect an increase in adaptive health protection behaviour.
Although contrary to expectations a bigger increase in melanoma
worry was achieved in the positive rather than the negative
interpretation bias training condition, more worry was associated
with more adaptive behaviour as assessed with a new prospective
measure of sun protection behaviour. Future studies should
investigate which cognitive bias modification paradigms are most
effective at targeting health related prevention/protection behav-
iour, and which types of worry need to be amplified to fuel this
adaptive behaviour.
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1. Lucas R, Prüss-Üstün A, McMichael T, Organization WH, Smith W, et al.
(2006) Solar Ultraviolet Radiation: World Health Organization.
2. Allen S, Zhu S, Sauter C, Layde P, Hargarten S (2006) A comprehensive
statewide analysis of seatbelt non-use with injury and hospital admissions: new
data, old problem. Acad Emerg Med 13: 4272434.
3. Witte K, Allen M (2000) A meta-analysis of fear appeals: Implications for
effective public health campaigns. Health Educ Behav 27: 5912615.
4. McCaul KD, Branstetter AD, Schroeder DM, Glasgow RE (1996) What is the
relationship between breast cancer risk and mammography screening? A meta-
analytic review. Health Psychol 15: 4232429.
5. MacLeod C (2012) Cognitive bias modification procedures in the management
of mental disorders. Curr Opin Psychiatry 25: 1142120.
6. MacLeod C, Rutherford E, Campbell L, Ebsworthy G, Holker L (2002)
Selective attention and emotional vulnerability: Assessing the causal basis of their
association through the experimental manipulation of attentional bias. J Abnorm
Psychol 111: 1072123.
7. Mathews A, Mackintosh B (2000) Induced emotional interpretation bias and
anxiety. J Abnorm Psychol 109: 6022615.
8. MacLeod C, Clarke PJF (2013) Cognitive Bias Modification: A New Frontier in
Cognition and Emotion Research. In: Robinson MD, Watkins ER, Harmon-
Jones E, editors. Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. New York: Guilford. pp.
5402562.
9. Ohman A, Mineka S (2001) Fears, phobias, and preparedness: Toward an
evolved module of fear and fear learning. Psychol Rev 108: 4832522.
10. Hirsch CR, Hayes S, Mathews A (2009) Looking on the bright side: Accessing
benign meanings reduces worry. J Abnorm Psychol 118: 44254.
11. Hayes S, Hirsch CR, Krebs G, Mathews A (2010) The effects of modifying
interpretation bias on worry in generalized anxiety disorder. Behav Res Ther 48:
1712178.
12. Hoppitt L, Mathews A, Yiend J, Mackintosh B (2010) Cognitive Bias
Modification: The Critical Role of Active Training in Modifying Emotional
Responses. Behav Ther 41: 73281.
13. Webb TL, Sheeran P (2006) Does changing behavioral intentions engender
bahaviour change? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. Psychol Bull
132: 2492268.
14. Verkuil B, Brosschot JF, Thayer JF (2007) Capturing worry in daily life: Are trait
questionnaires sufficient? Behav Res Ther 45: 183521844.
15. Spielberger C, Gorsuch R, Lushene R, Vagg P, Jacobs G (1983) Manual for the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory STAI (Form Y): Self-evaluation questionnaire.
Alto: Ca: Consulting Psychologist Press.
16. Barnes LL, Harp D, Jung WS (2002) Reliability generalization of scores on the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Edu Psycholl Meas 62: 6032618.
17. Stober J, Joormann J (2001) A short form of the Worry Domains Questionnaire:
construction and factorial validation. Pers Individ Dif 31: 5912598.
18. Cancer Council Australia Website PSC. http://www.cancer.org.au Accessed 15
Dec 2012
19. Tukey JW (1977) Exploratory Data Analysis: Addison-Wesley.
20. Fazio RH (1990) A practical guide to the use of response latency in social
psychological research. In: Hendrick C, Clark MS, editors. Review of
Personality and Social Psychology. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. pp.
74297.
21. Mikulincer M (1996) Mental rumination and learned helplessness: Cognitive
shifts during helplessness training and their behavioral consequences. In:
Sarason IG, Pierce GR, Sarason BR, editors. Cognitive interference: Theories,
methods, and findings. Mahwah: NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 1912209.
22. Ciarocco NJ, Vohs KD, Baumeister RF (2010) Some good news about
rumination: task-focused thinking after failure facilitates performance improve-
ment. J Soc Clin Psychol 29: 105721073.
23. Mackintosh B, Mathews A, Eckstein D, Hoppitt L (2013) Specificity effects in the
modification of interpretation bias and stress reactivity. J Exp Psychopathol 4:
1332147.
24. Mermelstein R, Weeks K, Turner L, Cobb J (1999) When tailored feedback
backfires: A skin cancer prevention intervention for adolescents. Canc Res Ther
Contr 8: 69279.
25. De Rooij MJM, Rampen FHJ, Schouten LJ, Neumann HAM (1997) Factors
influencing participation among melanoma screening attenders. Acta Derm
Venereol 77: 4672470.
26. McCaul KD, Mullens AB (2003) Affect, thought, and self-protective health
behavior: The case of worry and cancer screening. Soc Psychol Foundation of
Health and Illness: 1372168.
27. Rivkin ID, Taylor SE (1999) The effects of mental simulation on coping with
controllable stressful events. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 25: 145121462.
28. Faul F, Erdfelder E, Lang AG, Buchner A (2007) G*Power 3: a flexible statistical
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences.
Behav Res Methods 39: 1752191.
29. Clarke PJF, Nanthakumar S, Notebaert L, Holmes EA, Blackwell SE, et al.
(2013) Simply Imagining Sunshine, Lollipops and Rainbows Will Not Budge the
Bias: The Role of Ambiguity in Interpretive Bias Modification. Cognit Ther Res.
30. Teachman BA, Addison LM (2008) Training Non-Threatening Interpretations
in Spider Fear. Cognit Ther Res 32: 4482459.
31. Lange W-G, Salemink E, Windey I, Keijsers GPJ, Krans J, et al. (2010) Does
Modified Interpretation Bias Influence Automatic Avoidance Behaviour? Appl
Cogn Psychol 24: 3262337.
32. Pictet A, Coughtrey AE, Mathews A, Holmes EA (2011) Fishing for happiness:
The effects of generating positive imagery on mood and behaviour. Behav Res
Ther 49: 8852891.
33. Dandeneau SD, Baldwin MW, Baccus JR, Sakellaropoulo M, Pruessner JC
(2007) Cutting stress off at the pass: Reducing vigilance and responsiveness to
social threat by manipulating attention. J Pers Soc Psychol 93: 6512666.
CBM to Increase Worry and Adaptive Behaviour
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 January 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e85092
